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Can reading others’ emotional states be shaped by expertise? We assessed processing
of emotional facial expressions in professional actors trained either to voluntary activate
mimicry to reproduce character’s emotions (as foreseen by the “Mimic Method”),
or to infer others’ inner states from reading the emotional context (as foreseen by
“Stanislavski Method”). In explicit recognition of facial expressions (Experiment 1), the
two experimental groups differed from each other and from a control group with no acting
experience: the Mimic group was more accurate, whereas the Stanislavski group was
slower. Neither acting experience, instead, influenced implicit processing of emotional
faces (Experiment 2). We argue that expertise can selectively influence explicit recognition
of others’ facial expressions, depending on the kind of “emotional expertise”.
Keywords: facial expressions, conscious recognition, emotions, expertise, simulation, mentalizing
INTRODUCTION
Identification of emotional facial expressions is an ability of
high surviving value that can be accomplished through activa-
tion of two main mechanisms, i.e., simulation and mentalizing
(Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Decety and Grezès, 2006; Schulte-
Rüther et al., 2007; Apperly, 2008; Bastiaansen et al., 2009). On
one hand, an attributor can understand the mental state of an
agent by covertly mimicking or reenacting the same activity of the
agent without producing an overt behaviour (Goldman, 2002).
An observer can attribute a mental state to a target by replicating
the target’s state in her/his own mind and assigning the output of
this process to the target; the observer could also test a hypoth-
esized state by mentally simulating it and verifying whether its
outcome matches that of the target (Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
On other hand, mentalizing, also known as theory of mind (Frith
and Frith, 1999), can be conceived of as those higher cognitive
operations devoted to infer other people’s mental states from
their actions, gestures, faces and the surrounding context. Such
an information-based approach would play a crucial role in social
interactions, because inferential processes would enable humans
to decode other people’s intentions and to modify behaviour
accordingly (Blakemore, 2010).
A specifically regards recognition of other’s emotions, it is
well-known that observation of another person’s emotional facial
expression elicits a corresponding expression in the onlooker
(Niedenthal, 2007). Several electromyographic studies have
revealed covert facial muscle activity during observation of emo-
tional faces; facial muscles involved in production of specific
emotional expressions are also activated during the observa-
tion of the very same emotional faces (Dimberg and Thunberg,
1998; Dimberg et al., 2000). On the other hand, individuals can
infer and attribute an emotion to a target by employing their
knowledge on correspondence between particular facial config-
urations and emotional labels (Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
Recent neurofunctional studies showed that mentalizing-related
brain areas, such as medial frontal cortex or temporo-parietal
junction, are activated during recognition of facial expressions
(Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; Peelen et al., 2010; Mattavelli et al.,
2011).
Simulation and mentalizing can both operate in an explicit
or an implicit way (Decety and Grezès, 2006; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2006; Goldman, 2009). As regards simulation, recent
data from developmental and adult neuropsychology showed
that simulation of other’s emotions can be accomplished by
recruitment of implicit or explicit processes related to activa-
tion of involuntary or voluntary motor pathways (Oberman
et al., 2009; Pistoia et al., 2010). With respect to mentalizing, it
has been proposed a distinction between an earlier developing
path, allowing implicit monitoring of other’s mental states in a
social environment, and a later developing path, more depen-
dent on general cognitive functions that allows explicit infer-
ence of others’ mental states (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). No
study has investigated yet whether and how expertise in simula-
tion and mentalizing can shape explicit and implicit processing
of others’ emotional states in adult life. To tackle these issues,
two groups of professional actors trained to different acting
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methods underwent behavioral tasks requiring explicit recogni-
tion (Experiment 1) or implicit processing (Experiment 2) of
emotional facial expressions.
Professional actors were experts either in the “Stanislavski
Method” or in the “Mimic Method”, that are two popular acting
techniques. TheMethod originally developed by the Russian actor
and theatre director Constantin Sergeyevich Stanislavski assumes
that, in order to act as realistically as possible, the actor has to
immerse into the character so deeply that she/he “becomes” the
character; to this aim, the actor has to disassemble the descrip-
tions of character from the text to capture deep psychological
traits and has to resort to her/his own repertory of emotional
memories and mental images to produce a reliable performance
on stage (Benedetti, 1982). Instead, the “Mimic Method”, devel-
oped in Italy by the theatre director Orazio Costa, requires the
actor to train her/his natural imitative skills in order to gain and
enhance the capacity to capture relevant aspects of the character’s
personality and behaviour. The actor learns to act through imita-
tion and action rehearsal analogously to the physical training of
an athlete (Boggio, 2001).
Here, we could predict that in the “Mimic actors” the exten-
sive training to exploit voluntary mimicry to simulate emotions
could enhance explicit recognition of facial expressions. On the
contrary, in the “Stanislavski actors” the long-lasting exercise
to explicitly think about the contents of someone else’s mind
by means of abstract representations should slow down the
capacity to consciously recognize emotions from faces. Such a
pattern of results would be consistent with neuropsychologi-
cal evidence on brain-damaged patients showing that a defect
of simulative processes can account for impairments of iden-
tification of facial expressions, thus suggesting that emotional
faces engage simulation more than mentalizing (Goldman and
Sripada, 2005). Moreover, we predicted that actors’ expertise
in consciously reading others’ emotional states could affect
explicit but not implicit processing of facial expressions. This
prediction would fit evidence reviewed above underlining a dis-
tinction between processing systems involved in explicit and
implicit reading of others’ intentions and emotions (Apperly




Thirty professional actors recruited in three main Italian act-
ing schools volunteered to participate in the experiment. Fifteen
actors experts in the “Mimic Method” (10 female; mean age =
35.2 years, SD = 5.6) and 15 actors experts in the “Stanislavski
Method” (10 female; mean age = 31.9, SD = 7.1) had completed
a 4-year acting training course 1–4 years before the present study
was performed, and, from then on, they were pursuing a variety
of careers in many different acting fields (e.g., movies, TV series
or theatrical plays). Before starting the study, we ascertained that
all the professional actors did not receive specific training or were
familiar with facial expressions from the Facial Action Coding
System (FACS, Ekman and Friesen, 1978). Thirty subjects with-
out any previous acting experience, matching actors for age and
sex (20 female; mean age = 33.7 years, SD = 4.9), were recruited
as controls. All participants were white Caucasian, right-handed
and had normal or corrected to normal vision. The study was
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of Helsinki
Declaration; written informed consent was obtained from all the
subjects.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
In Experiment 1 (explicit recognition of emotional facial expres-
sions) stimuli were photographs (8.6◦ × 10.4◦ of visual angle
at a viewing distance of 60 cm) of 10 white Caucasian individ-
uals (5 females) displaying a happy, fearful, angry, disgusted,
surprised, or sad expression, selected from the “Pictures of
Facial Affect” set (Ekman and Friesen, 1976); hair and non-
facial areas were digitally occluded so that only the central face
area was visible. The 60 experimental stimuli (10 items × 6
emotions) were preceded by six practice trials consisting in pic-
tures of one additional model posing the six emotional expres-
sions. For each stimulus, subjects were required to choose the
expressed emotion among six labels (i.e., happiness, sadness,
anger, fear, disgust and surprise; see Figure 1A). Participants pro-
vided their response by pressing with the right hand one of six
keys of the QWERTY keyboard (“R, T, Y, U, I, O”) marked
with the emotion labels, whose order was counterbalanced across
subjects.
In Experiment 2 (implicit processing of emotional facial expres-
sions) stimuli were obtained from photos of four white Caucasian
individuals (two female and two male) displaying a happy, fearful,
angry, disgusted, surprised, sad or emotionally neutral expres-
sion, selected from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set; hair and
non-facial areas were digitally occluded so that only the central
face area was visible. In order to reduce perceptual variability,
gray-scale images were converted to “line drawings” (17.6 pix-
els Gaussian Blur filter was applied). As a result, only pixels
belonging to the eye, eyebrow, mouth, nose, and cheek regions
were retained, while all other pixels were converted to white;
after this conversion, one main difference among images was
the emotional expression conveyed (Horstmann and Bauland,
2006; Krysko and Rutherford, 2009). Each stimulus included an
array of 4 faces presented at the corners of an imaginary square,
each face (4.6◦ × 5.8◦ of visual angle at a viewing distance of
60 cm) being equidistant from the centre. Half stimuli included
one target face with an emotional expression and three neutral
faces, with the target appearing randomly in one of the image
locations (target-present). The other half stimuli included four
faces with the same emotional expression (target-absent); each
target-absent array was repeated 4 times. The complete stimu-
lus set thus included 48 target-present items (2 identities × 6
emotional expressions × 4 spatial locations) and 48 target-absent
items (2 identities × 6 emotional expressions × 4 repetitions),
for a total of 96 trials; before starting the experiment 6 practice
trials were given. Participants were instructed to concentrate on
the fixation cross at the start of each trial, and then to determine
whether there was a discrepant face or all faces were the same
(see Figure 1B); it is worth underlining here that task instruc-
tions did not make reference to emotional information displayed
by stimuli (Krysko and Rutherford, 2009). They had to respond
by pressing one of two keys on the QWERTY keyboard (“B” or
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FIGURE 1 | Trial sequence in Experiment 1 showing an angry facial expression (A), and in Experiment 2 showing of a target-present condition with a
target fearful expression (B).
“H”), with stimulus-response mapping counterbalanced across
subjects.
In both Experiments, stimuli were preceded by a fixation cross
for 1000ms and were centrally presented on a computer screen
until subjects gave their response. Order of stimuli was random-
ized within Experiments; order of Experiments was counterbal-
anced across subjects. Participants were encouraged to respond
as fast and correctly as possible; both Reaction Times (RTs, in
milliseconds) and accuracy were recorded. Stimulus presenta-
tion and data collection were controlled by a PC using Cedrus
SuperLab v.4.
At the end of the experiment, all participants underwent a
semi-structured interview (debriefing session) in which they were
asked several questions basically tapping four aspects: how they
rated difficulty of either task, whether their own acting experience
affected performance on either task, whether they feel that either
task elicited emotional reactions, and whether the two tasks were
solved in the same or different way.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
A Two-Way mixed ANOVA, with emotion (disgust, happiness,
fear, anger, surprise, and sadness) as a within-subject factor
and group (Mimic group, Stanislavski group and controls) as
a between-subject factor, was performed on accuracy and cor-
rect RTs.
Percentage of correct responses plotted against the six emo-
tions are shown in Figure 2A separately for the three groups.
The Two-Way mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of
emotion, F(5, 285) = 39.867, p = 0.0001; η2p = 0.412, and group,
F(2, 57) = 13.621, p = 0.0001; η2p = 0.323, whereas the emotion
by group interaction was not statistically significant, F(10, 285) =
1.547, p = 0.122, η2p = 0.051. Post-hoc comparisons (paired t-
tests) on the main effect of emotion showed that happiness,
surprise, and disgust were significantly easier to be recognized
than the other emotions (all p < 0.036, the significance threshold
set according to False Discovery Rate, FDR, procedure for tak-
ing into account the number of multiple comparisons; Benjamini
and Hochberg, 1995), whereas sadness, anger and fear did not
differ between each other (p > 0.036). More relevantly, instead,
post-hoc comparisons (unpaired t-tests, with the significance level
set at p < 0.033 according to FDR procedure) on the main effect
of group revealed that the Mimic group (82%) was significantly
more accurate than both the Stanislavski (74%; t = −4.181, p =
0.0001) and the control group (73.7%; t = −4.868, p = 0.0001),
whereas the Stanislavski and the control group did not differ
between each other (−0.200, p = 0.842). These data strongly fit-
ted with those previously reported in literature, and also patterns
of confusions between emotion categories overlapped with avail-
able evidence (Ekman et al., 1987; Matsumoto, 1992; Jack et al.,
2009). Actually, participants from the three groups mainly con-
fused fear for surprise (from 23% to 29% on overall accuracy),
disgust for anger (from 12% to 22%), anger for surprise (from
9% to 14%) and disgust (from 6% to 15%), surprise for fear (from
8% to 12%), and sadness for disgust (from 7% to 11%) and fear
(from 7% to 11%).
Mean RTs plotted against the six emotions are shown in
Figure 2B separately for the three groups. The Two-Way mixed
ANOVA revealed significant main effects of emotion, F(5, 285) =
24.067, p = 0.0001, η2p = 0.297, and group, F(2, 57) = 4.627, p =
0.014, η2p = 0.140, whereas the emotion by group interaction was
not statistically significant, F(10, 285) = 0.991, p = 0.451, η2p =
0.034. Post-hoc comparisons (paired t-tests) on the main effect
of emotion generally confirmed RTs data: recognition of happi-
ness and disgust was faster than recognition of fear, anger and
sadness and recognition of surprise was faster than recognition
of happiness and fear (but no comparison reached the signifi-
cance threshold according to FDR procedure: p < 0.007). Post-
hoc comparisons (unpaired t-tests) on the main effect of group
revealed that the Stanislavski group was slower (3085ms) than
both the Mimic group (2624ms, t = −2.271, p = 0.031) and
controls (2667ms, t = −2.357, p = 0.029); both comparisons
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FIGURE 2 | Percentages of correct responses (A) and RTs (B) plotted against the six emotions, separately in the three groups. Bars represents SEM.
were statistically significant according to FDR procedure for mul-
tiple comparisons (p < 0.016). The difference between theMimic
and the control group, instead, was far from the significance level
(t = 0.328, p = 0.745).
EXPERIMENT 2
Two-Waymixed ANOVAs, with emotion (disgust, happiness, fear,
anger, surprise, and sadness) as a within-subject factor and group
(Mimic group, Stanislavski group and controls) as a between-
subject factor, was performed both on accuracy and correct RTs.
Following previous studies (e.g., Krysko and Rutherford, 2009),
the two ANOVAs were conducted separately for target-present
and target-absent trials.
Target-present trials
Percentage of correct responses plotted against the six emotions
are shown in Figure 3A separately for the three groups. The Two-
Way mixed ANOVA on accuracy revealed a significantmain effect
of emotion, F(5, 210) = 6.19, p = 0.001; η2p = 0.128, whereas the
main effect of group, F(2, 42) = 0.001, p = 0.991, η2p = 0.000, and
the emotion by group interaction, F(10, 210) = 1.380, p = 0.189,
η2p = 0.062, were not statistically significant. Post-hoc compar-
isons (paired t-tests) on the main effect of emotion showed that
recognition of sadness was significantly less accurate than hap-
piness, fear, and surprise (all p < 0.001 with the significance
level set at p < 0.033 according to FDR procedure). No signifi-
cant differences were detected among all the other emotions (all
p > 0.05).
Mean RTs plotted against the six emotions are shown in
Figure 3B separately for the three groups. The Two-Way mixed
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(5, 210) =
8.812, p = 0.0001; η2p = 0.174, whereas the main effect of
group, F(2, 42) = 0.063, p = 0.939, η2p = 0.003, and the emotion
by group interaction, F(10, 210) = 0.943, p = 0.494, η2p = 0.043,
were not statistically significant. Post-hoc comparisons (paired
t-tests) performed on the main effect of emotion showed that
recognition of sadness was significantly slower than recognition
of happiness, fear and surprise (all p < 0.001 with the signifi-
cance level set at p < 0.033 according to FDR procedure). No
significant differences were detected among all other emotions
(all p > 0.05).
Target-absent trials
Percentage of correct responses plotted against the six emo-
tions separately in the three groups are shown in Figure 3C.
The Two-Way mixed ANOVA did not reveal any significant main
effect [emotion: F(5, 210) = 1.32, p = 0.255, η2p = 0.031; group:
F(2, 42) = 0.224, p = 0.799, η2p = 0.011] or emotion by group
interaction, F(10, 210) = 0.590, p = 0.824, η2p = 0.027.
Mean RTs plotted against the six emotions, separately in
the three groups are shown in Figure 3D. The Two-Way mixed
ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effect [emo-
tion: F(5, 210) = 0.940, p = 0.456, η2p = 0.022; group: F(2, 42) =
1.123, p = 0.245, η2p = 0.044] or emotion by group interaction,
F(10, 210) = 0.671, p = 0.751, η2p = 0.031.
DEBRIEFING SESSION
Participants rated task difficulty in different way depending on
the acting experience and on the kind of the experimental task.
Actually, Stanislavski actors judged the explicit recognition task
more difficult than the implicit processing task; Mimic actors,
instead, did not appreciate substantial differences between the
two tasks.When asked to report whether their performance might
have been influenced by their acting technique, participants from
both groups indicated that they thought their task performance
was strongly influenced by the acting experience. As specifically
regards Experiment 1, Stanislavski actors referred to be in dis-
comfort during the task because they had to force themselves
to analyse others’ emotional states in an unusual way; actually,
most of them (11/15) complained that facial cues are not suffi-
cient to capture others’ emotions. On the contrary, Mimic actors
reported that the explicit recognition task put them in a rather
“typical situation”, one which they are accustomed to in their act-
ing experience. Participants from both groups generally stated
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FIGURE 3 | Percentages of correct responses and RTs (bars represents SEM) plotted against the six emotions in the three groups, separately for
target-present trials (A and B) and target-absent trials (C and D).
that the explicit recognition task activated their own emotional
reactions, whereas the implicit processing did not. In particular,
most participants referred to have relied on visual analysis of per-
ceptual differences among faces in each display, without paying
relevant attention to the expressed emotion: eight Stanislavski
actors and five Mimic actors reported to be completely unaware
about the emotional nature of the task, and they did not
realize that facial stimuli in the display conveyed emotional
information.
DISCUSSION
The first main finding of the present study is the demonstra-
tion that recognition of emotional facial expressions can be
shaped by experience in a highly specific fashion depending
on the nature of the training experience. Actually, results of
Experiment 1 showed that when required to explicitly iden-
tify emotions the Mimic group was significantly more accu-
rate than both the Stanislavski group and controls, whereas the
Stanislavski group was significantly slower than both the Mimic
group and controls. By contrast, no effect of acting training was
found on the performance on the implicit task for both groups
(Experiment 2).
Classical studies on the effect of expertise on visual process-
ing have emphasized the role of pure visual perceptual mecha-
nisms in favoring effective post-training performance on visual
discrimination tasks (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991; Schyns and Rodet,
1997; Tanaka et al., 2005). Recently, instead, a number of behav-
ioral and neurofunctional studies have suggested that motor,
action-related mechanisms can play a crucial role in visual exper-
tise (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Casile andGiese, 2006; Cross et al.,
2006, 2009; Aglioti et al., 2008).
In a seminal behavioral study, Casile and Giese (2006) showed
that when blindfolded subjects learned to perform new complex
action patterns by means of verbal and haptic feedback they also
improved their ability to discriminate the same actions visually.
This motor-mediated enhancement of action recognition is sub-
served by increased neural activity in premotor and parietal areas:
expert male and female dancers show higher parieto-premotor
activation while observing ballet moves from their own motor
repertory compared to opposite-gender moves that they fre-
quently see but do not perform (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006).
Accordingly, learning complex dance patterns modulates neural
motor activity during the observation of practiced as compared
to visually familiar, but unpracticed, movements (Cross et al.,
2006, 2009). The present results demonstrated that not only sim-
ulative processes involved in action recognition but also those
related to more complex aspects of social cognition, such as emo-
tion recognition, are affected by expertise. Following the idea
that experts can “read the kinematics” of observed action they
are trained to (Aglioti et al., 2008), here we suggest that the
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advantage of “Mimic actors” in the explicit emotion recognition
was related to the voluntary engagement of their own facial mus-
culature to understand others’ emotional states. In such a task,
mentalizing can even interfere with understanding of emotional
states. Actually, slower performance of Stanislavski actors might
be ascribed to their specific acting technique, which imposes
them to deeply analyze not only other’s mimicry but also the
context in which the emotional state emerges. Therefore, when
task requirements forced Stanislavski actors to extract emotional
information exclusively from facial expression, their “mentaliz-
ing training” likely slowed down performance. Although at the
moment this interpretation lacks of a direct manipulation check
(external measures demonstrating different mentalizing and sim-
ulation abilities in the two groups), it seems to be consistent with
a study on mind-reading skills of psychotherapists. Hassenstab
et al. (2007) found that therapists did not differ from controls
when making inferences based on facial cues, i.e., explicit recog-
nition of facial expressions (Ekman and Friesen, 1976), and the
eye test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), whereas they were signifi-
cantly better when making inferences based on observation of
naturalistic videos (i.e., to report feelings, thoughts, and inten-
tions of an actor involved in a dinner party), likely due to
their tendency to adopt cognitive-based strategies to comprehend
others’ emotional states. The present results are also in keep-
ing with the demonstration that practice can modify emotional
responses to observation of others’ pain: while observing nee-
dles being inserted into others’ body parts, physicians experts
in acupuncture showed activation of areas involved in mental-
izing and emotion regulation (e.g., medial prefrontal cortices
and the temporo-parietal junction) and not in regions underpin-
ning the affective aspects of pain processing (e.g., the anterior
insula, somatosensory cortex and periaqueductal gray; Cheng
et al., 2007).
The second relevant point of the present study was that
acting expertise did not modulate implicit processing of facial
expressions (Experiment 2). In healthy individuals, observation
of happy and angry faces determines a corresponding mimic
response in the observer (Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg
et al., 2000). This facial response is spontaneous (i.e., without
external prompting or a goal to mimic; Dimberg and Lundquist,
1988), unconscious (i.e., it occurs even when faces are pre-
sented subliminally), and rapid (i.e., it emerges within 1 s after
face presentation; Dimberg et al., 2000). By contrast, volun-
tary facial expressions are effortful and slow (Dimberg et al.,
2002), are affected by contextual demands and involve differ-
ent neurofunctional mechanisms (Ekman, 1992; Morecraft et al.,
2004). Recent neuropsychological data support that voluntary
facial motility contributes to explicit but not implicit process-
ing of emotional facial expressions. Actually, autistic individuals,
whose spontaneous mimicry is impaired, perform tasks requir-
ing explicit recognition of facial expressions as well as normal
controls (Oberman et al., 2009). On the contrary, severely motor-
disabled patients with complete paralysis of voluntary facial
movements are selectively impaired in explicit recognition of
facial expressions (Pistoia et al., 2010). On this basis, we suggest
that extensive training in simulating emotions through conscious
and voluntary activation of facial mimicry would guarantee a
high level of accuracy in explicit, but not implicit, recognition
of others’ emotional states. By the same token, the “mental-
izing training” of Stanislavski actors modulated performance
on the explicit but not the implicit task, thus revealing that
explicit and implicit mentalizing processes can be dissociated.
Senju et al. (2009) demonstrated that individuals with Asperger
syndrome adequately solve tasks requiring explicit mentalizing
(verbal false-belief tasks), whereas they are impaired in measures
of spontaneous, implicit mentalizing (i.e., anticipatory eye move-
ments while viewing false-belief scenes). According to Senju et al.
(2009) spared explicit mentalizing in individuals with Asperger
syndrome might be accounted for by compensatory learning
mechanisms fostered in the pathological brain. Our experimen-
tal data provided clear evidence that learning processes can also
shape mind-reading in the healthy brain. Observations from the
debriefing session supported this conclusion by suggesting that
participants were aware of relationships between their acting
experience and their performance on the explicit recognition task.
As regards the implicit processing task, instead, participants of
both groups reported that they performed the task mainly rely-
ing on perceptual visual analysis, without paying attention to
the expressed emotion; some participants were even not aware
that facial stimuli in the display conveyed emotional information.
The lack of differences between the two groups in the implicit
processing experiment might thus be ascribed to the fact that par-
ticipants mainly relied on matching of visual features, with only
marginal processing of emotional information. It should be taken
into account also that the different perceptual features of stimuli
used in Experiments 1 and 2 might have biased our results. For
instance, the visual angle in Experiment 1 was nearly double that
of Experiment 2 (see Smith and Schyns, 2009 for evidence on the
effect of viewing distance on identification of facial expressions).
On these bases, further investigation are warranted to better clar-
ify whether acting experience influences implicit processing of
emotional faces.
CONCLUSIONS
In a seminal study Ekman et al. (1983) investigated emotion-
specific activity of the autonomic nervous system in professional
actors by requiring them to pose specific facial expressions or
reliving past emotional experiences. Results showed differences
in emotion-specific autonomic patterns between voluntary acti-
vation of emotion-related mimicry and reactivation of emotion-
related representations. Here, we demonstrated that expertise
can shape explicit recognition but not implicit processing of
facial expressions. Moreover, since we found that expertise in the
Stanislavski or the Mimic methods differently affected perfor-
mance on the explicit task, we could suggest that recognition of
facial expressions can be shaped by experience in a highly spe-
cific fashion depending on the nature of the training experience.
It is worth noticing here that in our experiments we employed
highly prototypical stimuli, as in most studies on recognition of
emotional states (for a review see Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
However, one should take into account that laboratory setting
cannot fully represent processing of emotional facial expressions
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in real-life situations (Hess and Blairy, 2001; Bastiaansen et al.,
2009). Future investigations should assess recognition of emo-
tional faces by means of paradigms employing more ecologically
valid facial expressions, such as stimuli from the Matsumoto and
Ekman’s (1988) Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of
Emotions (JACFEE).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to Rachele Viggiano for discussions on the Mimic
Method, and actors from the “Cinema fiction” of Naples, the
“Compagnia teatrale Tiberio Fiorilli” of Bari, and from the “Coro
Drammatico Renato Condoleo” of Firenze for their participation
in the study.
REFERENCES
Aglioti, S. M., Cesari, P., Romani, M.,
and Urgesi, C. (2008). Action antic-
ipation andmotor resonance in elite
basketball players.Nat. Neurosci. 11,
1109–1116.
Apperly, I. A. (2008). Beyond
simulation-theory and theory-
theory: why social cognitive
neuroscience should use its own
concepts to study “theory of mind”.
Cognition 107, 266–283. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.019
Apperly, I. A., and Butterfill, S. (2009).
Do humans have two systems to
track beliefs and belief-like states?
Psychol. Rev. 116, 953–970.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill,
J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I. (2001).
The “Reading the Mind in the
Eyes” test revised version: a study
with normal adults, and adults
with Asperger syndrome or high-
functioning autism. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiat. 42, 241–251.
Bastiaansen, J. A., Thioux, M., and
Keysers, C. (2009). Evidence for
mirror systems in emotions. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
2391–404.
Benedetti, J. (1982). Stanislavski, An
Introduction. London: Methuen.
Benjamini, Y., and Hochberg, Y. (1995).
Controlling the false discovery rate
- a practical and powerful approach
to multiple testing. J. R. Stat. Soc.
Ser. B 57, 289–300.
Blakemore, S. J. (2010). The develop-
ing social brain: implications for
education. Neuron 65, 744–747. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.004
Boggio, M. (2001). Il Corpo Creativo.
La Parola e il Gesto in Orazio Costa.
Rome: Bulzoni.
Calvo-Merino, B., Grezes, J., Glaser, D.
E., Passingham, R. E., and Haggard,
P. (2006). Seeing or doing? Influence
of visual and motor familiarity in
action observation. Curr. Biol. 16,
1905–1910.
Casile, A., and Giese, M. A. (2006).
Nonvisual motor training influences
biological motion perception. Curr.
Biol. 16, 69–74.
Cheng, Y., Lin, C. P., Liu, H. L.,
Hsu, Y. Y., Lim, K. E., Hung, D.,
et al. (2007). Expertise modulates
the perception of pain in others.
Curr. Biol. 17, 1708–1713.
Cross, E. S., Hamilton, A. F., and
Grafton, S. T. (2006). Building
a motor simulation de novo:
observation of dance by dancers.
Neuroimage 31, 1257–1267. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.01.033
Cross, E. S., Kraemer, D. J., Hamilton,
A. F., Kelley, W. M., and Grafton, S.
T. (2009). Sensitivity of the action
observation network to physical
and observational learning. Cereb.
Cortex 19, 315–326.
Decety, J., and Grezès, J. (2006). The
power of simulation: Imagining
one’s own and other’s behav-
ior. Brain Res. 1079, 4–14. doi:
10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115
Dimberg, U., and Lundquist, O.
(1988). Facial reactions to facial
expressions: sex differences.
Psychophysiology 25, 442–443.
Dimberg, U., and Thunberg, M. (1998).
Rapid facial reactions to emotional
facial expressions. Scand. J. Psychol.
39, 39–45.
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., and
Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious
facial reactions to emotional facial
expressions. Psychol. Sci. 11, 86–89.
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., and
Grunedal, S. (2002). Facial reactions
to emotional stimuli: automatically
controlled emotional responses.
Cogn. Emot. 16, 449–471. doi:
10.1080/02699930143000356
Ekman, P. (1992). An argu-
ment for basic emotions.
Cogn. Emot. 6, 169–200. doi:
10.1080/02699939208411068
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. V. (1976).
Pictures of Facial Affect. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists.
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. V. (1978).
Facial Action Coding System: A
Technique for the Measurement of
Facial Movement. Palo Alto, CA:
Consulting Psychologists Press.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., O’Sullivan,
M., Chan, A., Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis,
I., Heider, K., et al. (1987).
Universals and cultural differ-
ences in the judgments of facial
expressions of emotion. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 53, 712–717.
Ekman, P., Levenson, R.W., and Friesen
W. V. (1983). Autonomic nervous
system activity distinguishes among
emotions. Science 221, 1208–1210.
doi: 10.1126/science.6612338
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (1999).
Interacting minds – a biological
basis. Science 286, 1692–1695. doi:
10.1126/science.286.5445.1692
Gallese, V., and Goldman, A. (1998).
Mirror neurons and the simula-
tion theory of mind-reading. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 2, 493–501.
Goldman, A. I. (2002). “Simulation
theory and mental concepts,”
in Simulation and Knowledge of
Action, eds J. Dokic and J. Proust
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company), 1–19.
Goldman, A. I. (2009). “Mirroring,
mindreading and simulation,” in
Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role
of Mirroring Processes in Social
Cognition, ed J. A. Pineda (New
York, NY: Humana), 311–329.
Goldman, A. I., and Sripada, C.
S. (2005). Simulationist models
of face-based emotion recogni-
tion. Cognition 94, 193–213. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2004.01.005
Hassenstab, J., Dziobek, I., Rogers, K.,
Wolf, O. T., and Convit, A. (2007).
Knowing what others know, feel-
ing what others feel: a controlled
study of empathy in psychother-
apists. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 195,
277–281.
Hess, U., and Blairy, S. (2001). Facial
mimicry and emotional contagion
to dynamic emotional facial expres-
sions and their influence on decod-
ing accuracy. Int. J. Psychophysiol.
40, 129–141. doi: 10.1016/S0167-
8760(00)00161-6
Horstmann, G., and Bauland,
A. (2006). Search asymme-
tries with real faces: testing
the anger-superiority effect.
Emotion 6, 193–207. doi:
10.1037/1528-3542.6.2.193
Jack, R. E., Blais, C., Scheepers,
C., Schyns, P. G., and Caldara,
R. (2009). Cultural confusions
show that facial expressions are
not universal. Curr. Biol. 29,
1543–1548.
Keysers, C., and Gazzola, V. (2006).
Towards a unifying neural theory
of social cognition. Prog. Brain Res.
156, 379–401. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(06)56021-2
Krysko, K. M., and Rutherford, M. D.
(2009). A threat-detection advan-
tage in those with autism spectrum
disorders. Brain Cogn. 69, 472–480.
doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2008.10.002
Matsumoto, D., and Ekman, P.
(1988). Japanese and Caucasian
Facial Expressions of Emotion
(JACFEE) [Slides]. San Francisco,
CA: Intercultural and Emotion
Research Laboratory, Department
of Psychology, San Francisco State
University.
Mattavelli, G., Cattaneo, Z., and
Papagno, C. (2011). Transcranial
magnetic stimulation of medial
prefrontal cortex modulates face
expressions processing in a priming
task. Neuropsychologia 49, 992–998.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2011.01.038
Matsumoto, D. (1992). American-
Japanese cultural differences in
the recognition of universal facial
expressions. J. Cross Cult. Psychol.
23, 72–84.
Morecraft, R. J., Stilwell-Morecraft,
K. S., and Rossing, W. R. (2004).
The motor cortex and facial
expression: new insights from neu-
roscience. Neurologist 10, 235–249.
doi: 10.1097/01.nrl.0000138734.
45742.8d
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying
emotion. Science 316, 1002–1005.
doi: 10.1126/science.1136930
Oberman, L. M., Winkielman, P., and
Ramachandran, V. S. (2009). Slow
echo: facial EMG evidence for the
delay of spontaneous, but not vol-
untary, emotional mimicry in chil-
dren with autism spectrum disor-
ders.Dev. Sci. 12, 510–520.
Peelen, M. V., Atkinson, A. P., and
Vuilleumier, P. (2010). Supramodal
representations of perceived
emotions in the human brain.
J. Neurosci. 30, 10127–10134. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2161-10.2010
Pistoia, F., Conson, M., Trojano,
L., Grossi, D., Ponari, M.,
Colonnese, C., et al. (2010).
Impaired conscious recognition
of negative facial expressions in
patients with locked-in syndrome.
J. Neurosci. 30, 7838–7844. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6300-09.2010
Schyns, P. G. and Rodet, L.
(1997). Categorization cre-
ates functional features. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 23,
681–696.
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 382 | 7
Conson et al. Recognition of facial expressions in professional actors
Schulte-Rüther, M., Markowitsch, H. J.,
Fink, G. R., and Piefke, M. (2007).
Mirror neuron and theory of mind
mechanisms involved in face-to-
face interactions: a functional mag-
netic resonance imaging approach
to empathy. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19,
1354–1372.
Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S.,
and Frith, U. (2009). Mindblind
eyes: an absence of spontaneous
theory of mind in Asperger syn-
drome. Science 325, 883–885. doi:
10.1126/science.1176170
Smith, F. W. and Schyns, P. G.
(2009). Smile through your fear
and sadness: transmitting and
identifying facial expression
signals over a range of view-
ing distances. Psychol. Sci. 20,
1202–1208.
Tanaka, J. W., Curran, T., and
Sheinberg, D. L. (2005).
The training and trans-
fer of real-world perceptual
expertise. Psychol. Sci. 16,
145–151.
Tanaka, J. W., and Taylor, M. (1991).
Object categories and expertise:
is the basic level in the eye of
the beholder? Cogn. Psychol. 23,
457–482.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 13 February 2013; accepted:
10 June 2013; published online: 28 June
2013.
Citation: Conson M, Ponari M,
Monteforte E, Ricciato G, Sarà M,
Grossi D and Trojano L (2013) Explicit
recognition of emotional facial expres-
sions is shaped by expertise: evidence
from professional actors. Front. Psychol.
4:382. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00382
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Emotion Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Conson, Ponari,
Monteforte, Ricciato, Sarà, Grossi and
Trojano. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 382 | 8
